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IMPROVING CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
Welsh S. White* 
THE FAILURE OF TiiE CruMIN.t\L PROCEDURE REVOLUTION. By 
Craig M. Bradley. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
1993. Pp. x, 264. $34.95. 
For criminal procedure aficionados, the 1960s were an exciting 
period. In almost every year of that decade, the Supreme Court 
handed down a landmark criminal procedure decision establishing 
new rights for criminal suspects. In 1961, for example, Mapp v. 
Ohio1 held that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies 
in state as well as federal criminal cases. Two years later, Gideon v. 
Wainwright2 held that indigent criminal defendants are entitled to 
representation by counsel at trial. In 1966, Miranda v. Arizona3 re-
shaped the law of police interrogation,4 and a trilogy of cases de-
cided in 19675 sought to improve the fairness of police identification 
procedures.6 As Craig Bradley7 explains in his engaging and pro-
vocative book, The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolunon, 
by the time Chief Justice Warren left the Court in 1969, criminal 
procedure had entered a new era. In place of the old regime, under 
which only the Court's "shock the conscience" or "fundamental 
fairness" test checked the states' freedom to regulate criminal pro-
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1962, Harvard; L.L.B. 1965, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. - Ed. I would like to thank Albert Alschuler, Randy Lee, Jules Lobel, 
Anne Schiff, and my wife Linda who commented on earlier drafts of this review and Melanie 
Bradish who assisted in preparing the footnotes. 
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
3. 384 U.S. 436 {1966). 
4. In Miranda, the Court held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination." 384 U.S. at 444. 
5. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 {1967); 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
6. Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (establishing that a criminal defendant has the right to have 
counsel present at a pretrial lineup); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272 (same); Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-
302 (establishing that pretrial identifications that are unnecessarily suggestive and conducive 
to irreparable mistaken identifications must be excluded as violations of due process). 
7. Craig Bradley, who was a law clerk to Chief Justice Rehnquist, is presently a professor 
of law at the University of Indiana. 
1667 
1668 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:1667 
cedure,8 the Supreme Court had established what Judge Henry 
Friendly critically characterized as a constitutional code of criminal 
procedure.9 
Bradley provides an interesting and generally accurate account 
of the criminal procedure changes effected by the Warren Court. In 
evaluating the criminal procedure revolution, he observes that the 
Warren Court decisions resulted in salutary changes that subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions have not altered. Not only are 
criminal defendants afforded substantially greater protections at 
trial,10 but also "police respect for constitutional rights has in-
creased considerably" (p. 37). In support of the latter statement, 
Bradley observes with approval that police receive training in crimi-
nal procedure, prosecutors place pressure on the police to follow 
the law, and "[t]he 'third degree' seems to have largely disappeared 
from the American scene" (p. 37). 
Nevertheless, Bradley claims that "the criminal procedure 
revolution has failed because it does not provide adequate guidance 
to police as to what to do" (pp. 37-38). Using interesting hypotheti-
cals devised by himself and Professor Albert Alschuler (pp. 52-54), 
as well as statistical data (pp. 46-47), Bradley maintains that the 
Court's decisions on search and seizure and on confessions are vir-
tually incomprehensible.11 As a result, the Court's criminal proce-
dure rules provide inadequate guidance to the police and result in 
"disturbingly high numbers of cases lost due to evidentiary exclu-
sion" (p. 44). · 
In the remainder of his book, Bradley offers an explanation for 
this unfortunate state of affairs and several suggestions for cor-
recting it. In a chapter that is particularly interesting because it 
draws from the firsthand knowledge he gained as a Supreme Court 
clerk,12 Bradley asserts that the lack of clarity in our constitutional 
8. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("Due process of law .•• pre-
cludes defining, and thereby confining •.. standards of conduct more precisely than to say 
that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice.' "). 
9. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 262-63 (1967). 
10. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that criminal defendants 
have a right to trial by an impartial jury); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) 
(holding that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a speedy trial); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal defendants have a constitu~ 
tional right to the assistance of appointed counsel). 
11. Bradley maintains that the Supreme Court has not established a comprehensive body 
of confession or search law because of its case-specific system. As a result of this system, 
"criminal procedure law will only become more and more murky and difficult as police and 
courts try to wade through an ever-growing body of complex precedent looking in vain for 
ever-more-elusive answers to everyday questions." P. 55. 
12. Pp. 62-94. Bradley explains the evolution of Supreme Court decisions. He suggests, 
for example, that certain parts of the majority opinion in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 
(1975), may have been included so that Justice Stewart, who wrote that opinion, would be 
able to persuade as many Justices as possible to join the majority opinion, rather than simply 
concurring in the result Pp. 65-66. 
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criminal procedure rules cannot be attributed to the ideological 
makeup of either the Warren or the Burger-Rehnquist Courts, but 
is instead an inevitable byproduct of the way the Court operates as 
an institution (p. 62). 
In seeking a corrective device to address this problem, Bradley 
examines the experience of six other countries.13 While he does not 
endorse the specific approaches of any of these countries, Bradley 
suggests that their experiences provide at least two valuable lessons. 
First, a discretionary exclusionary rule may be preferable to a 
mandatory one.14 Second, a legislative body can more effectively 
provide criminal procedure rules than a court (p. 130). Bradley 
then presents his primary proposal for improving constitutional 
rules of criminal procedure: Congress should appoint a special 
commission to codify rules of criminal procedure. The task of this 
commission would be largely limited "to codifying and clarifying 
current Supreme Court law, and to making the rules more compre-
hensive, rather than substantially changing the law's ideological 
content" (p. 145). 
Anyone who is interested in either criminal procedure or the 
Supreme Court should read this book. Bradley is a fluent writer 
who makes the issues he discusses vivid and interesting. Moreover, 
his analysis is never superficial or ideological. He has formulated a 
thoughtful proposal and provided a sophisticated analysis of the 
benefits and detriments of its implementation. Even those who dis-
agree with Bradley's principal positions will be impressed by his in-
sights and will gain a deeper understanding of our criminal justice 
system from his book. 
I am one of those who disagree with Bradley's principal conten-
tions. In this review, I will discuss several of his positions and my 
objections. Part I addresses Bradley's premise that the lack of clar-
ity in the Court's criminal procedure decisions stems from the 
Court's limitations as an institution. While agreeing with Bradley 
that some of the Court's criminal procedure rules are hopelessly 
muddled, this Part challenges Bradley's claim that the Supreme 
Court could not have done any better. It asserts that the rules' lack 
of clarity stems more from the ideological differences between the 
Warren Court and its successors than from any inherent limitations 
13. Bradley examines criminal procedure practices in England, France, Germany, Italy, 
Canada, and Australia. P. 95. 
14. P. 129. Bradley is somewhat ambivalent regarding his preference for a discretionary 
exclusionary rule. He observes that, unlike a mandatory rule, a nonmandatory exclusionary 
rule will, in most cases, result in nonexclusion. Additionally, he states that if he were drafting 
legislation, he might not include a discretionary exclusionary rule because it is such a major 
departure from current Jaw. Nevertheless, he intimates that a discretionary exclusionary rule 
would be preferable to our present exclusionary rule (p. 56) and states that "the uniform 
practice of other countries in this regard cannot be ignored" (p. 132). 
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of the Court. Part II addresses Bradley's suggestion that a discre-
tionary exclusionary rule may be preferable to a mandatory one. 
While not disputing his claim that this approach works well in other 
countries, this Part maintains that it would not be efficacious in this 
country. Part III addresses Bradley's proposal that Congress em-
power a federal commission to enact a code of constitutional crimi-
nal procedure. For both theoretical and practical political reasons, 
this Part concludes that the proposed commission would not im-
prove our system of justice. Finally, Part IV briefly addresses the 
question whether the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution 
failed. 
I. CLARITY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
What makes the rules of criminal procedure complicated? In 
many cases, the police precipitate the uncertainty by pushing for 
exceptions to a rule that seems clear. If the Court responds by es-
tablishing an exception, the police will interpret that exception, 
"apply [it] themselves and ... push [it] to the limit."15 If in re-
sponse the Court establishes further exceptions or broadens the ex-
isting one, the law is likely to become unclear. 
Miranda, 16 the Warren Court's landmark decision on confes-
sions, may not be a model of clarity in every respect.17 But the 
Court did seem clear in identifying the content of the warnings the 
police are required to give criminal suspects before subjecting them 
to custodial interrogation.18 In response to Miranda, many police 
departments issued cards imprinted with the four specified warn-
ings so that the police could read them to suspects.19 Consistent 
with Miranda, one of the warnings invariably told suspects that they 
had the right to have an attorney present during police interroga-
tion even if they could not afford to hire one. 
Police in Hammond, Indiana, added a phrase to this standard 
warning, however. After stating that the suspect had the right to 
the advice and presence of a lawyer even if he could not afford to 
pay for one, the warning continued, "We have no way of giving you 
a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when 
you go to court."20 This warning is arguably inconsistent with Mi-
randa's requirement that the police inform the suspect that he will 
15. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 {1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
17. See 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[F]ine points of [Miranda's] scheme are 
far less clear than the Court admits."). 
18. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73. 
19. See United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610, 613 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
20. Duckworth v. ~agan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989) (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 
F.2d 1554, 1555-56 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
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be provided with an attorney before any interrogation.21 At best, it 
is confusing.22 Nevertheless, in Duckworth v. Eagan,23 the Court, in 
a 5-4 decision, held that the warning did not violate Miranda. 
Professor Yale Kamisar has argued that because of the contra-
dictory message contained in the Hammond, Indiana, warnings, 
Duckworth is inconsistent with Miranda. 24 I agree. My point, how-
ever, is not that Duckworth is wrong but that it creates an uncertain 
exception to a rule that prior to Duckworth appeared clear. More-
over, after Duckworth, what further exceptions are the police likely 
to seek? As Kamisar says, "Many new versions of the Miranda 
warnings are likely to emerge (and some once-disapproved formu-
lations are likely to resurface )."25 Duckworth sends the message to 
the police that the content of the required Miranda warnings is not 
nearly so inflexible as they may have thought. As a result, an area 
of the law that once seemed clear has become unclear. 
Many other post-Warren Court decisions have also obscured the 
meaning of Miranda. 26 To take another example, Miranda pro-
vided a seemingly clear rule governing a warned suspect's request 
for counsel: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the 
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."27 In Ed-
wards v. Arizona, 28 the Burger Court reaffirmed this rule but estab-
lished an exception to it: once the suspect asserted his right to an 
attorney, the police would have to cease the interrogation until an 
attorney was made available to him "unless the accused himself ini-
21. Yale Kamisar, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause 
Much Mischief, 25 CRIM. L. BuLL. 550, 552-53 (1989). 
22. See United States ex rel Williams v. 1\vomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(rejecting a virtually identical warning on the grounds that it was "misleading," "confusing," 
and "contradictory"). 
23. 492 U.S. 195 (1989). 
24. Kamisar, supra note 21, at 552-53. In Duckworth, the warnings gave suspects a con-
tradictory message because they told suspects that they had the right to the advice and the 
presence of a lawyer but that the police had no way of providing them with a lawyer. Thus, 
the warning is inconsistent with Miranda because Miranda held that the police must inform 
suspects that they are entitled to a lawyer prior to any interrogation, even if they cannot 
afford one. 
25. Id. at 561. For example, a past formulation of the second Miranda warning, "anything 
you say can and will [or may] be used against you," which has been rejected but may resur-
face, is a warning advising suspects that anything they say can be used "for or against" them. 
As Kamisar observes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated this warning in Common-
wealth v. Singleton, 266 A.2d 753 (Pa 1970). See Kamisar, supra note 21, at 561. 
26. See pp. 53-54 (quoting Albert Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Bur-
ger Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1436, 1442-43 (1987) (describing a hypothetical "police train-
ing manual" - offering advice that will allow officers to avoid the effect of Miranda - that 
provides excellent examples of exceptions to Miranda that the post-Warren Court established 
and of the effect that those exceptions may have on police interrogation practices)). 
27. 384 U.S. at 474. 
28. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
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tiate[ d] further communications, exchanges, or conversations with 
the police. "29 
On its face, the Edwards "initiation" exception to Miranda may 
not have seemed very significant. Taken in context, Edwards 
seemed to suggest that, once the accused invoked his right to an 
attorney, the police could not attempt further interrogation unless 
the accused on his own initiative indicated to the police that he had 
changed his mind and would prefer to discuss the criminal charges 
with the police without the presence of counsel. In Oregon v. Brad-
shaw, 30 however, the Court interpreted the "initiated further com-
munications" exception much more broadly. 
In Bradshaw, the police gave the defendant his Miranda warn-
ings and the defendant asserted his right to an attorney. The police 
then terminated the interrogation. A few minutes later, the defend-
ant said, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" After 
rewaming the defendant of his Miranda rights, the police interro-
gated the defendant and obtained a confession.31 The Court split 4-
4 as to whether the defendant's question, "Well, what is going to 
happen to me now?" constituted "initiating" communications 
within the meaning of Edwards. Speaking for four Justices, Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that it did meet the Edwards standard be-
cause "[a]lthough ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case 
as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a 
desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation. "32 A 
fifth Justice, Powell, declined to accept Edwards's test but agreed 
with the Rehnquist plurality that the lower court properly admitted 
the defendant's confession.33 
After Edwards and Bradshaw, it will admittedly be difficult to 
determine when courts will permit the police to resume the interro-
gation of a suspect who has invoked his right to an attorney. If, 
after requesting an attorney, the suspect makes any substantive 
statement to the police,34 the police may have legitimate doubts as 
to whether the suspect's statement constitutes an "initiation" of 
communications that will permit them to resume their efforts at in-
29. 451 U.S. at 485. 
30. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). 
31. 462 U.S. at 1042 (quoting App. at 16). 
32. 462 U.S. at 1045-46. 
33. Justice Powell agreed with the Rehnquist plurality that the lower court properly ad-
mitted the confession because the facts and circumstances established a valid waiver. 462 
U.S. at 1050 (Powell, J., concurring). 
34. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion observed that "some inquiries, such as a request 
for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone •.• are so routine that they cannot be 
fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized 
discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation." 462 U.S. at 1045. Beyond that, 
however, the Court provided no guidelines as to when a suspect's statement to the police 
would constitute "initiation." 
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terrogation. But are the police to be pitied because of this uncer-
tainty in the law? If the police had simply complied with Miranda's 
rule that interrogation must cease once the suspect requests an at-
torney, no uncertainty would exist. Successful police efforts to cre-
ate and then exploit an exception to that rule caused the 
uncertainty. 
If the Court had resisted police efforts to create exceptions to 
Miranda, Miranda's mandate would have been clearer. As Bradley 
points out (pp. 72-73), however, the post-Warren Court did not 
agree with Miranda and, yet, was reluctant to overrule it. Professor 
Geoffrey R. Stone somewhat euphemistically explained that this 
conflict "exert[ed] considerable strain on the [C]ourt in its efforts to 
deal forthrightly with the issues posed by [Miranda]. "35 In fact, as 
Bradley's examples (pp. 51-54), as well as those discussed above, 
demonstrate, the post-Warren Court has frequently distorted Mi-
randa or distinguished the case on disingenuous grounds. As a re-
sult, Miranda's clarity, which could have been one of its strengths,36 
has been seriously compromised. 
The clarity of the Warren Court's search and seizure decisions 
has been similarly eroded. In Chimel v. California, 37 one of the 
Warren Court's last cases, the Court overruled a nineteen-year-old 
precedent38 and established a new rule governing an officer's au-
thority to search incident to arrest. That rule, which limited an ar-
resting officer's power to search to the area within the immediate 
control of the arrestee,39 seemed to be based on the principle that 
the scope of an officer's right to search without a warrant should be 
limited by the exigencies justifying such a search. An arresting of-
ficer can search the arrestee's person and the area within his reach 
without a warrant because such a search is necessary to prevent the 
arrestee from using a weapon against the officer or from immedi-
ately destroying evidence. Because no further warrantless search is 
justified, no further search is permitted. 
Although Chimel only decided the scope of an officer's power to 
make a warrantless search incident to an arrest, the decision's ra-
tionale could be applied to govern other warrantless search situa-
tions. In general, the police should not be permitted to make a 
warrantless search unless the search is justified by a special govern-
35. Geoffrey Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. Cr. REv. 99. 
36. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) ("Miranda's holding has the 
virtue of infonning police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in con-
ducting custodial interrogation and of infonning courts under what circumstances statements 
obtained during such interrogation are not admissible."). 
37. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
38. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
39. 395 U.S. at 763. 
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mental interest. As Bradley recognizes,40 this rule would be clear 
even though it would not dictate a clear result in every case. The 
police would know that before making a search, they are required 
to obtain a warrant unless they can show that taking the time to 
obtain a warrant would lead to some special problem such as dan-
ger to themselves or the loss of evidence. 
If the post-Warren Court had applied this principle, many of the 
anomalies in our law of search and seizure would not have arisen. 
Because there would have been no reason to distinguish between 
container searches41 and auto searches,42 for example, the Court 
would not have had to resolve puzzling issues relating to whether 
the search of a container found in an automobile should be treated 
as a container search requiring a warrant43 or as a part of an auto 
search not requiring a warrant.44 In that situation, as in others, the 
police would have to obtain a search warrant unless they could 
point to some exigent circumstances. As with confessions, however, 
the post-Warren Court was tom between adhering to precedent and 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment in a way that would serve the 
interests of law enforcement. As a result, the Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has become the "mass of contradictions 
and obscurities"45 that Bradley deplores. 
Bradley is correct in pointing out that the Court is institutionally 
incapable of rendering a coherent and comprehensive set of rules 
governing police practices.46 Nevertheless, the incredible confusion 
caused by the present constitutional rules governing police practices 
can be attributed more to the ideological tension between the War-
ren Court and its successors than to any inherent limitations in the 
Court's institutional structure. This point, which is not recognized 
by Bradley, bears on the theoretical viability of his principal 
proposal. 47 
40. In a chapter entitled "Alternative Models of Criminal Procedure," Bradley character-
izes this approach as "Model I" and asserts that one of its benefits is that it would generally 
lead to clear results. See pp. 168-70. 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 {1977) {holding that absent exigent 
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial warrant to search a container). 
42. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (establishing that warrantless 
searches of automobiles are generally permissible). 
43. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1979). 
44. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570-73 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798, 799 {1982). 
45. P. 49 (quoting Craig M. Bradley, '.IWo Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 1468, 1468 (1985)). 
46. For a discussion of the reasons for the Court's inability to perform this task, see infra 
text accompanying notes 84-86. 
47. See infra Part III. 
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Il. DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSION 
Bradley asserts that there are two kinds of unreasonable 
searches: searches that are flagrantly unreasonable because the po-
lice conduct "is offensive" or "obviously violates a clear rule," and 
searches that are unreasonable because they "break rules the Court 
has deemed important" (p. 56). He observes that in the six other 
countries he has studied, evidence obtained from the second type of 
unreasonable search is not subject to mandatory exclusion. Indeed, 
he concludes that the United States "is unique in having a (theoreti-
cally) mandatory rule for searches that are 'unreasonable' only be-
cause they break the (often confusing) rules" (p. 48). Drawing 
from this experience, Bradley proposes that a new American code 
adopt a discretionary exclusionary rule (p. 56). 
At first blush, Bradley's proposal seems attractive. If a discre-
tionary exclusionary rule has worked in other countries; why not try 
it here? Moreover, as Bradley observes (p. 131), providing a court 
with this option might lead it to be more forthright in deciding 
whether the police violated a constitutional norm. Instead of 
straining the law to avoid the drastic remedy of exclusion, a court 
would be able to hold that the police violated the constitution -
thus providing guidance in future cases - and, yet, admit the evi-
dence obtained. 
There is, however, some danger in assuming that remedies effec-
tive in other countries will also work in this country. As Professor 
Phillip Johnson has pointed out, in seeking to improve our system 
of justice, our unique set of attitudes and traditions dictates that 
"[w]e can no more import our solutions than we can export our 
problems."48 Thus, before we decide whether to follow other coun-
tries in adopting a discretionary exclusionary rule, some of the per-
tinent differences between this country and other nations must be 
examined. 
One obvious difference is that, unlike other countries, the 
United States has a constitutional provision that prohibits unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. In this country, therefore, the Court 
has a special obligation. In addition to defining the content of the 
constitutional provision - that is, determining what is a reasonable 
search or seizure - the Court must provide some means of enforc-
ing the constitutional prohibition. Otherwise, the constitutional 
provision will be reduced to a "form of words."49 
In theory, of course, there are many ways of enforcing the pro-
hibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. For example, 
courts could allow tort remedies for victims of unreasonable 
48. Phillip E. Johnson, Importing Justice, '01 YALE LJ. 406, 414 {1977) (book review). 
49. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
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searches, preside over criminal prosecutions of police who conduct 
unreasonable searches, or even mandate that police departments 
issue guidelines to minimize such searches. In practice, however, 
the only remedy that has ever made the Fourth Amendment mean-
ingful to the police has been the exclusionary rule.so 
Before Mapp v. Ohio,s1 police in jurisdictions that did not have 
the exclusionary rule "were not aware that constitutional standards 
for search and seizure had been applied to them. "52 Indeed, after 
the Mapp decision, the New York City Police Commissioner said 
that the Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule had had a "trau-
matic effect" on his department, requiring a wholesale reevaluation 
of procedures.53 Of course, Mapp had imposed no new Fourth 
Amendment restrictions on the police. From the police perspec-
tive, however, there had been no Fourth Amendment prohibition 
until the Court adopted the exclusionary rule. 
The exclusionary rule has now become a part of our culture. 
Professor Milton A. Loewenthal's comprehensive study of police 
attitudes54 concludes that the police "could neither understand nor 
respect a Court which purported to impose constitutional standards 
on the police without excluding evidence obtained in violation of 
those standards. "55 Just as repealing the exclusionary rule would 
signal the police that the Fourth Amendment standards are not to 
be taken seriously,56 making the exclusionary rule discretionary 
would signal the police that in those situations in which the Court 
will not exercise its discretion to exclude evidence, the Fourth 
Amendment no longer applies. 
Bradley observes that his experiences in Germany and Australia 
led him to believe that "a 'discretionary' exclusionary rule was no 
exclusionary rule - a remedy that was paid lip service by the 
courts but was not seriously enforced, and hence had no substantial 
impact on police behavior" (p. 130). His study of other countries, 
however, especially Great Britain and Canada, convinced him that 
a discretionary exclusionary rule could be effective in this country 
(p. 130). 
50. See Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Responsibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclu-
sionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21-23 {1987). 
51. 367 U.S. 643 {1961). 
52. Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 
UMKC L. REV. 24, 29 (1980). 
53. Yale Kamisar, The exclusionary rule in historical perspective: the struggle to make the 
Fourth Amendment more than "an empty blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337, 347 {1979). 
54. Loewenthal, supra note 52. 
55. Id. at 29. 
56. Id. at 30; see also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Ori· 
gins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 
COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1386 (1983). 
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Is there reason to believe that our courts' administration of a 
discretionary exclusionary rule would be similar to the administra-
tion of such a rule in England and Canada? In England, it is part of 
the political culture for the legislature to protect minority rights. 
Indeed, it has been observed that "to transgress the rights of the 
individual or the minority is bad politics."57 That level of concern 
for preventing official lawlessness has never been present in this 
country. 
Changing the exclusionary rule from mandatory to discretionary 
would have a profound effect on judicial behavior. If the exclusion-
ary rule is mandatory, the conscientious judge will be able to say he 
had no choice: the law required him to exclude the evidence. If the 
exclusionary rule is discretionary, however, the judge cannot make 
this statement. He may properly exercise his discretion to admit 
the evidence. Given the political system within which most judges 
operate,5s a judge will be disinclined to exercise his discretion to 
exclude evidence. The public, which is concerned with effective law 
enforcement,59 will not be impressed with the claim that the deci-
sion to exclude evidence was appropriate to safeguard a criminal's 
constitutional rights. Moreover, the judge will not even be able to 
defend his discretionary decision to exclude evidence by asserting 
that federal law mandated it. From the public's point of view, the 
judge who exercises his discretion to exclude evidence is choosing 
to make it more difficult to convict an accused criminal. Because a 
judge will not want to be perceived as impeding effective law en-
forcement, he will generally exercise his discretion to admit the evi-
dence. From the police perspective, this means that the Fourth 
Amendment standards will be lowered.60 
If the effect of a discretionary exclusionary rule would be to 
lower the constitutional standards, then we need to consider 
whether such modification would be wise. By distinguishing be-
tween two types of unreasonable police conduct,61 Bradley implies 
that some police conduct now subject to the exclusionary rule does 
not really need to be deterred. It is interesting to observe, however, 
that the only examples Bradley provides of searches that are "un-
57. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN-
MENT 82 (1955). 
58. In this country, most state court judges are elected and therefore particularly suscep-
tible to political pressure. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1503, App. B (1994). 
59. In a national survey, "researchers found that a majority of Americans favor giving 
police broader powers to stop and search suspects - even without probable cause - and 
would be willing to loosen restrictions on the use of improperly obtained evidence in trials." 
Bob Dart, Safety beats freedom in public survey: Americans ready to give up rights to help cut 
crime, ATLANTA CoNST., Sept 11, 1994, at A7. 
60. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
61. See supra part II. 
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reasonable" but not offensive involve search warrant cases that, 
under current law, would not be subject to the exclusionary rule.62 
In fact, the post-Warren Court has already lowered Fourth Amend-
ment standards to the point where the exclusionary rule is not likely 
to apply unless the police conduct is either quite egregious or a 
clear violation of an existing rule.63 Thus, adopting a discretionary 
exclusionary rule would be ill-advised because it would further re-
duce already low constitutional safeguards . 
. III. THE PROPOSED 'FEDE:RAL COMMISSION 
Bradley's proposed federal commission would enact a code of 
constitutional criminal procedure. According to Bradley, one of 
the benefits of this enterprise is that it would add clarity to the law 
of criminal procedure (p. 145). From a theoretical perspective, 
however; it is difficult to see how a commission could add clarity to 
the law when its task would essentially be to "codify[ ] ... current 
Supreme Court law ... [without] substantially changing the law's 
ideological content" (p. 145). As Bradley emphasizes, the Court's 
current criminal procedure law is hopelessly muddled. Moreover, 
as I indicated in Part I, much of the current law's lack of clarity 
stems from the ideological tension between the Warren Court and 
its successors. Clarifying the law without changing its ideological 
content would be difficult, if not impossible. 
An example that Bradley discusses illustrates the nature of the 
problem. In New York v. Belton, 64 the Court established the rule 
that an officer who makes "a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant 
of an automobile ... may, as a contemporaneous incident of that 
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile,''65 in-
cluding any containers found in the passenger area.66 The Court 
justified this rule as an extension of Chime!, and it specifically de-
62. The only examples Bradley cites are "the searches in Leon and Spine/IL" P. 56. 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), holds that the search warrant at issue was 
invalid because of the insufficiency of the affidavit of probable cause. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213 (1983), the Court overruled Spinelli and established a much more lenient standard 
of probable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), also involves the validity of a 
search warrant. Under the more lenient Gates standard, the affidavit of probable cause in 
Leon would have almost certainly been sufficient. The Court did not consider that issue, 
however, but instead decided that evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant in Leon would 
be admissible because the officers executing the warrant had an objectively reasonable belief 
that the warrant was valid. 
63. For a discussion of some of the ways in which the Court has lowered Fourth Amend-
ment standards, see Kamisar, supra note 50, at 39-42. 
64. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
65. 453 U.S. at 460. 
66. 453 U.S. at 460-61 (holding that the police may examine the contents of any contain-
ers, both opened and closed, found within the passenger compartment of a car, including 
glove compartments). 
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nied that its holding disturbed that precedent in any way.67 Under 
Chime!, the officer's power to search incident to arrest extends to 
the area within the physical control of the arrestee.68 The Court in 
Belton concluded that when the police arrest the occupant of an 
automobile, the passenger compartment of the automobile is "gen-
erally, even if not inevitably, within" the area of the search author-
ized by Chime[. 69 In order to provide clear guid~ce to the police, 
the Court created a bright· line rule that permits searches of the pas-
senger compartment.7o 
As Justice Brennan observed·in dissent,71 however, Belton can-
not be viewed as consistent with Chime!. When, as in Belton it-
self,72 the occupant of an' automobile· is arrested,outside of the car, 
it would be implausible to claim that the interior of the vehicle is 
within the arrestee's physical control. Moreover, there is even less 
reason to believe that containers within the interior of the automo-
bile - including locked luggage - will be within the arrestee's 
control. Thus, Belton is an example of the post-Warren Court 
straining precedent to reach a result favorable to law enforcement. 
Belton seems to provide a clear rule. But, as Justice Brennan 
pointed out,73 Belton does not resolve some issues related to an of-
ficer's authority to search an automobile incident to an arrest. For 
example, once the occupant has been arrested, how long may the 
police wait before conducting a warrantless search of his auto? Will 
Belton apply even if the police established probable cause to arrest 
the occupant only after he left the vehicle? If the officer has au-
thority to search the passenger compartment of the automobile, 
may the search include the interior of door panels or the area under 
the floorboards?74 
67. 453 U.S. at 460 n.3 ("Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of 
Chimel's principles in this particular •.. context. It in no way alters the fundamental princi-
ples established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful 
custodial arrests."). 
68. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
69. 453 U.S. at 460. 
70. 453 U.S. at 460. 
71. 453 U.S. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
72. The police officer in Belton directed the arrestee to get out of the car, placed him on 
an area of the New York Thruway, arrested and searched him, and then proceeded to search 
the automobile. 453 U.S. at 456. 
73. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
74. 453 U.S. at 469-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, as Alschuler has said, Belton 
may have implications for other search-incident-to-arrest situations. The government might 
argue, for example: 
Just as the Court permitted an officer to search a jacket in an automobile that had been 
near an arrestee at the time of his arrest despite the fact that the arrestee had been 
removed from the area, an officer should be allowed to search a jacket in a room that an 
arrestee no longer occupies so long as the jacket had been within the arrestee's "grab-
bing area" at the time of arrest. 
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Brennan observes that a police officer will have difficulty an-
swering these questions because the Court "abandons the justifica-
tions underlying Chimel"75 without providing any new rationale. 
Will a commission be in any better position to answer these ques-
tions than the police? What rationale should guide their decision-
making? If the commission focuses on the majority's statement in 
Belton - that they are adhering to Chime[ and simply establishing 
a bright-line rule that will be easy to administer - then the ques-
tions posed above will be answered adversely to the police76 be-
cause in these situations the police cannot plausibly claim that the 
area they searched was within the arrestee's control. On the other 
hand, if the commission rejects the Chime[ rationale on the ground 
that it does not justify the Belton rule,77 what new rationale should 
the commission apply? 
In explaining how the commission might operate, Bradley an-
swers some of the questions that Belton fails to resolve (p. 157). He 
states, for example, that the search incident to the arrest nee!f not 
be contemporaneous with the arrest78 and that the police will not 
be permitted to search areas inaccessible to passengers, such as the 
"the area under the floorboards, and the area behind door panels" 
(p. 157). While these answers may be helpful to the police, they 
seem arbitrary because they do not stem from any consistent view 
of the Fourth Amendment. Based on Belton, the opposite answers 
to these questions would be just as reasonable. Thus, if Bradley's 
proposed commission follows his mandate, it will be unable to pro- · 
duce guidelines that are meaningful in the sense that they reflect a 
consistent view of the relevant constitutional provisions. 
Bradley might respond that, because the police's need for gui-
dance is so great, answers that do not reflect a consistent view of 
the relevant constitutional provisions are better than no answers at 
all. I do not dispute that the police need guidance. My point is that 
the commission could not be ideologically neutral. In many in-
stances, the members would have to draw their answers from their 
own values, rather than from those reflected in the Court's criminal 
procedure decisions. Indeed, it appears Bradley drew his answers 
to the issues posed by the Belton case from values that were not 
Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 227, 
283-84 (1984). 
75. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
76. In these situations it cannot be said that the area to be searched is "generally, even if 
not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon 
or evidentiary ite[m].'" 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 
(1969) (alteration in original)). 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. 
78. P. 157. Bradley does not, however, specify how long an officer who arrests the occu-
pant of an automobile may wait before conducting a warrantless search of the vehicle. 
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articulated by Chime!, Belton, or any other applicable Fourth 
Amendment decision.19 
Of course, Bradley contemplates that the commission he pro-
poses would have wide powers and would also engage in some law 
reform. He suggests, for example, that the commission should seek 
to remedy one of the criminal justice system's most pernicious 
problems, mistaken identifications stemming from suggestive iden-
tifi.cation procedures,80 by providing that lineups and other identifi.-
cations "be photographed and tape recorded (or videotaped) and 
that these records be produced in court" (p. 84). A commission 
that would address the most important problems ·in our system of 
justice and that would be inclined foward adopting solutions that 
provide greater fairness to criminal suspects would indeed make a 
substantial contribution. Would the commission proposed by Brad-
ley be so inclined? 
Who would be appointed to the commission? Although Brad-
ley would like to minimize Congres~'s role in the work of the com-
mission,81 Congress would appoint the members of the commission. 
Given the current political climate, the commission's membership 
would certainly reflect the conservative constitutional view of the 
present congressional majority. A commission so composed would 
be more conservative than the current Supreme Court. Would such 
a commission be likely to provide new protections for criminal 
suspects? · 
ldentifi.cation procedures provide an apt example. If the com-
mission addressed the question of the admissibility of identifi.cation 
evidence, would it be inclined to reform police practices at lineups 
and other identifi.cations as suggested by Bradley? In 1968, when 
Congress was much less conservative than it is now, it passed a stat-
ute dealing with identifi.cation evidence. But, instead of providing 
79. Bradley states, for example, that he would extend the search pennitted by Belton 
because "[g]iven the privacy intrusion already occasioned by the arrest and search incident 
thereto, the clarity achieved by extending Belton . . • outweighs any further intrusion on 
privacy." P. 157. Although individual Justices have endorsed the view that a greater in-
fringement of privacy, such as an arrest, justifies a lesser infringement, such as an extended 
search incident to arrest, Chime! flatly rejects this rationale, see 395 U.S. at 766 n.12, and the 
Court has never adopted it. 
80. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) (presenting numerous 
cases in which completely innocent people were convicted by reason of misidentification); 
JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NoT GUILTY (De Capo Press 1971) (1957) (demon-
strating, through examples relating to the fallibility of witnesses, the capacity of the legal 
system to produce injustices); EUZABETH F. LoFrUs, & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS 
FOR THE DEFENSE: THE ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PuTs MEMORY 
oN TRIAL (1991) (recounting cases in which defendants convicted on the basis of eyewitness 
testimony were later shown to be not guilty). 
81. P. 145. Bradley proposes that Congress appoint a speciiil bipartisan commission or 
expand the power of the committee that drafts the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
that the legislature should retain only the authority to approve or disapprove the final 
product. 
1682 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:1667 
procedures for the police to follow, the 1968 Crime Control and 
Safe Street ActB2 simply provided that the Court's identification de-
cisions should be restricted so that eyewitness testimony would 
never be excluded from federal criminal trials.B3 Given today's 
political realities, Bradley's proposed commission would be much 
more likely to adopt this kind of approach than it would be to adopt 
procedures that provide protections for those accused of serious 
crimes. 
Delegating. constitutional rulemaking power to a federal com-
mission raises serious constitutional' issues that Bradley addresses 
(pp. 150-54). Assuming that Congress could give the commission 
power to act as Bradley proposes, in my judgment it would not be 
sound policy for Congress to establish this commission. If Supreme 
Court doctrine in fact constrained the commission, then the com-
mission would encounter difficulty in constructing a coherent body 
of criminal procedure rules. Moreover, to the extent that the com-
mission would be free to address problems in the administration of 
justice, political realities dictate that the commission would be un-
likely to address these problems in a manner that would enhance 
the fairness of our system of justice. 
IV. THE FAILED REVOLUTION? 
In assessing the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions, 
Bradley focuses almost entirely on its decisions regulating police 
practices.84 He concludes that the criminal procedure revolution 
failed because it did not "provide adequate guidance to police as to 
what to do" (p. 38). I have argued that the lack of clarity in the 
current constitutional rules governing search and seizure and con-
fessions stems at least in part from the ideological tension between 
the Warren Court and its successors.85 Nevertheless, if the criterion 
for a successful criminal procedure revolution is whether the 
82. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1988)). 
83. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 reads: 
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or participate in the commis-
sion of the crime for which the accused is being tried shall be admissible in evidence in a 
criminal prosecution in any trial court ordained and established under article III of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
18 U.S.C. § 3502. Inferior federal courts have ignored the legislation, feeling bound by the 
Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution. See Carl McGowan, Constitutional Interpreta· 
tion and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 235, 249-50 (1970). 
84. Although Bradley explains that the Warren Court applied nearly all of the provisions 
of the Bill of Rights to the states (p. 18), he does not discuss the impact of decisions such as 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), and 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which provided new constitutional protections to 
criminal defendants at trial. 
85. See supra Part I. 
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Court's decisions provide "adequate guidance" to the police, then 
no Court could succeed. 
As Professor Anthony Amsterdam has explained, when the 
Court reviews police conduct in criminal procedure cases, 
[i]ts view of the questioned conduct is limited to the appearance of 
the conduct on a particular trial record or records - records which 
may not even isolate or focus precisely upon that conduct. The Court 
cannot know whether the conduct before it is typical or atypical, un-
C<?nnected or connected with a set of other practices qr - if there is 
some connection - what is the comprehensive shape of the set of 
practices involved, what are their .relations, their justifications, their 
consequences.86 · · ·. _. ~ " 
Operating within this vacuum, the Court is deprived of the ability 
"to develop any organized regulation of ... police conduct."87 
Does this mean that the Warren Court's attempt to regulate po-
lice conduct was misguided? Echoing the views of more conserva-
tive commentators,ss Bradley suggests that the Warren Court's 
criminal procedure decisions caused "Congress and state legisla-
tures [to] largely abandon[] the field" (p. 144). But this is non-
sense. Prior to the Warren Court criminal procedure decisions, 
Congress and the state legislatures had already completely aban-
doned the field. Indeed, "a vast abnegation of responsibility . . . 
forced the Court to construct all the law regulating the everyday 
functioning of the police."89 If the legislatures were interested in 
regulating police conduct, why did they fail to do so? 
Moreover, the Wan;en Court did not preempt the legislatures. 
On the contrary, in some of its landmark decisions, the Court ex-
pressly invited Congress and other i;igencies to participate in provid-
ing rules for the police. In Miranda, for example, the Court stated 
that the specified procedures would be required."unless other fully 
effective means are devised to inform accused persons 'of their right 
of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it."90 
Similarly, in United States v. Wade,91 the Court emphasized that 
"[l]egislative or other regulations ... eliminat[ing] the risks of abuse 
and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impedi-
ments to meaningful confrontation at trial"92 . could displace the 
constitutional requirement imposed by the Court. In both cases, 
86. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal 
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 791 (1970). 
87. Id. 
88. See, e.g., Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A 
Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 938, 949 (1987).· 
89. Amsterdam, supra note 86, at 790. 
90. 384 U.S. at 444. 
91. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
92. 388 U.S. at 239. 
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the Court invited Congress to provide regulations that would ad-
dress a significant issue relating to the fairness of our system of jus-
tice. In both cases, Congress failed to provide a meaningful 
response.93 Thus, the criminal procedure revolution should not be 
faulted on the ground that it prevented Congress or other agencies 
from regulating police conduct. 
In deciding whether the criminal procedure revolution was a 
failure, the real question should not be whether the Court has pro-
vided adequate guidance for the police but, rather, whether the 
Court's decisions improved our system of justice. In my judgment, 
the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions led to several salu-
tary developments that probably would not have occurred 
otherwise. 
First, as Bradley notes (p. 37), the Court decisions changed po-
lice practices by making the police more sensitive to constitutional 
rights. As a result of the exclusionary rule, the police have received 
extensive training in criminal procedure. Even if some of the spe-
cific rules promulgated by the Court are unclear or ineffective, the 
training provided to the police makes it less likely that they will 
flagrantly violate a suspect's constitutional rights. Thus, even if the 
Miranda decision has too many loopholes to be effective,94 that de-
cision may have played a part in causing the virtual disappearance 
of the "third degree."95 
Second, the Warren Court decisions identified problems in the 
administration of ju~tice that the courts can ameliorate. Perhaps 
the most notable example is the problem of suggestive police identi-
fication procedures identified in the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy.96 
Prior to the lineup decisions, defendants' claims that identification 
evidence should be excluded because of suggestive identification 
procedures were dismissed as fanciful.97 Wade and its progeny ex-
posed the problem of miscarriages of justices occurring as a result 
of suggestive procedures and demonstrated that courts can provide 
remedies that will address this problem. Even though the post-
Warren Court has sharply limited the Warren Court's lineup deci-
sions,98 those decisions continue to have an impact because state 
93. In the 1968 Omnibus Crime Bill, Congress sought to repeal Miranda and Wade. See 
supra note 82. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 86, at 802. 
94. See supra note 26. 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11. 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6. 
97. See, e.g., Kennedy v. United States, 353 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
98. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (replacing Stovall's per se rule by which 
identifications stemming from unnecessarily suggestive procedures are excluded under a to· 
tality-of-circumstances test in which identifications stemming from unnecessarily suggestive 
procedures are not excluded unless there is "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-
identification"); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (limiting Wade to identifications con-
ducted after formal prosecutorial proceedings have been initiated). 
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courts, recognizing the legitimacy of the Warren Court's concern, 
have applied the principles emanating from the lineup decisions as 
a matter of state law.99 
Finally, the Warren Court criminal procedure decisions benefit-
ted our system of justice by articulating goals. In general terms, the 
Warren Court envisioned a system of justice under which the most 
important provisions of the Bill of Rights would provide meaning-
ful protection for criminal suspects,100 the inequality between the 
treatment afforded rich and poor would be reduced,101 and govern-
ment officials would treat criminal suspects with greater faimess.102 
Whether these goals are ever realized, they are valuable because 
they "state our aspirations. "103 In a climate in which the public's 
rising fear of crime causes increased emphasis on the needs of law 
enforcement, these aspirations are especially important. They re-
mind us that, under our Constitution, our system of justice should 
be concerned not only with convicting the guilty but also with pro-
viding meaningful protections against governmental abuse for both 
ordinary citizens and those accused of crimes. 
99. See, e.g., Livingston v. State, 519 So. 2d 1218 (Miss. 1988) (holding that a defendant 
arrested pursuant to a warrant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a preindictment 
lineup); Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351(Pa.1974) (holding that a defendant has a 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a preindictment lineup because, under Pennsylvania 
state law, the initiation of adversary proceedings begins when the defendant is arrested). 
100. As Bradley observes, nearly all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were applied to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 84. The Court sought to 
ensure that state criminal defendants were provided with at least the same protection that 
had previously been afforded federal defendants. 
101. See Amsterdam, supra note 86, at 797. 
102. Critics sometimes charge that the Warren Court was ~oo concerned with reaching a 
just result as opposed to adhering to constitutional principles. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE MoRAUTY OF CoNSENT 120-21 (1975) (noting that for Chief Justice Warren the 
essential question was whether the result was "right and good"). 
103. Amsterdam, supra note 86, at 793. 
